Like every major new technology, genetic engineering is affecting the hopes and fears of many people. The risks involved are perceived differently by different groups. One group regards genetic engineering as a simple extension of older techniques with no special risks, e.g. traditional breeding. This conservative denial of special risks is confronted with a different kind of conservatism from a group which, in the name of the preservation of nature, opposes any kind of genetic engineering. A third group, rooted in (...) the liberal tradition, is prepared to accept the risks of genetic engineering as long as they are outweighed by prospective benefits. The liberal as well as the two conservative approaches, however, face serious difficulties in trying to develop a sound ethical argument concerning genetic engineering. In order to avoid these difficulties, an ethical approach focused on paradigmatic examples of good and evil is proposed. Such examples constitute rules of moral description, much as standards of measurement constitute rules of physical description. These rules are elaborated and interpreted in processes of social learning. In the present state of development of genetic engineering, such social learning requires appropriate institutional procedures. (shrink)

We welcome the proposal to use forward models to understand predictive processes in language processing. However, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) miss the opportunity to provide a strong framework for future work. Forward models need to be pursued in the context of learning. This naturally leads to questions about what prediction error these models aim to minimize.

Unification grammars are known to be Turing-equivalent; given a grammar G and a word w, it is undecidable whether w L(G). In order to ensure decidability, several constraints on grammars, commonly known as off-line parsability (OLP), were suggested, such that the recognition problem is decidable for grammars which satisfy OLP. An open question is whether it is decidable if a given grammar satisfies OLP. In this paper we investigate various definitions of OLP and discuss their interrelations, proving that some of (...) the OLP variants are indeed undecidable. We then present a novel, decidable OLP constraint which is more liberal than the existing decidable ones. (shrink)

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an (...) entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between‐target differences, between‐judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction. (shrink)

The first classification of general types of transition between phases of matter, introduced by Paul Ehrenfest in 1933, lies at a crossroads in the thermodynamical study of critical phenomena. It arose following the discovery in 1932 of a suprising new phase transition in liquid helium, the “lambda transition,” when W. H. Keesom and coworkers in Leiden, Holland observed a λhaped “jump” discontinuity in the curve giving the temperature dependence of the specific heat of helium at a critical value. This apparent (...) jump led Ehrenfest to introduce a classification of phase transitions on the basis of jumps in derivatives of the free energy function. This classification was immediately applied by A.J. Rutgers to the study of the transition from the normal to superconducting state in metals. Eduard Justi and Max von Laue soon questioned the possibility of its class of “second-order phase transitions” -- of which the “lambda transition was believed to be the arche type -- but C.J. Gorter and H.B.G. Casimir used an “order parameter to demonstrate their existence in superconductors. As a crossroads of study, the Ehrenfest classification was forced to undergo a slow, adaptive evolution during subsequent decades. During the 1940s the classification was increasingly used in discussions of liquid-gas, order-disorder, paramagnetic-ferromagnetic and normal-super-conducting phase transitions. Already in 1944 however, Lars Onsagers solution of the Ising model for two-dimensional magnets was seen to possess a derivative with a logarithmic divergence rather than a jump as the critical point was approached. In the 1950s, experiments further revealed the lambda transition in helium to exhibit similar behavior. Rather than being a prime example of an Ehrenfest phase transition, the lambda transition was seen to lie outside the Ehrenfest classification. The Ehrenfest scheme was then extended to include such singularities, most notably by A. Brain Pippard in 1957, with widespread acceptance. During the 1960s these logarithmic infinities were the focus of the investigation of “scaling” by Leo Kadanoff, B. Widom and others. By the 1970s, a radically simplified binary classification of phase transitions into “first-order” and “continuous” transitions was increasingly adopted. (shrink)

Die Logik, einst Grundbestand der Philosophie, hat sich in unserem J ahrhundert zu einer selbstandigen Wissenschaft ent 1 wickelt. Sie wird zur Abgrenzung gegeniiber friiheren Gestalten "neue Logik" oder "moderne Logik" genannt; auch sind Be zeichnungen wie "theoretische Logik", "mathematische Logik", "symbolische Logik", "formale Logik", "Logistik" gebrauch 2 lich, urn die Eigenart der grundlegenden Methoden anzudeuten. Die genannten Benennungen werden in dieser Arbeit gleichbe rechtigt gebraucht. Mit 1. M. BOCHENSKI und A. MENNE kann man unter Logistik in weiterem Sinne "die (...) Lehre vom Logikkalkiil, seinen Voraus 3 setzungen und Anwendungen" verstehen. Die Absicht dieser Arbeit ist eine philosophische; sie fragt nach dem, was die Aussage als Aussage zum Element positiver Logik werden laBt. In Frage ist daher die Aussagen- und (ele mentare) Pradikatenlogik, die in formaler Hinsicht "durch den Vollstandigkeitssatz (Go DEL I930) und den Unentscheidbarkeits- 1 Texte zur Geschichte der modernen Logik: I.M. BOCHENSKI, Formale Logik, Freiburg-Miinchen I956, S. 3II-477. 2 s. z.B.: B. JUH6s, Elemente der neuen Logik, Wien I954. G. HASEN]AEGER, Einfuhrung in die Grundbegritfe und Probleme der modernen Logik, Freiburg-Miinchen I962. D. HILBERT und W. ACKERMANN, Grundzi~ge der theoretischm Logik, 3. Aufl., B- lin-Gi:ittingen-Heidelberg I949. H. SCHOLZ und G. HASEN]AEGER, Grundzuge der mathematischen Logik, Berlin 1961. H. HERMES, Einfuhrung in die mathematische Logik, Stuttgart 1963. R. CARNAP, Symbolische Logik, Wien 1954. P. LORENZEN, Formale Logik. I.M. BOCHENSKI, GrundrifJ der Logistik, aus dem Franzi:isischen iibers., neubearb. und erweitert von A. MENNE, 2. erweiterte Auf I., Paderborn 1962. (shrink)

Glückwunsch, von W. Jaeger.--Grenzsituationen der Gegenwart, von A. Wenzl.--Theologische Ontologie, von G. Jacoby.--Wissenschaft, Philosophie, Weltanschauung. von J. Barion.--Theorie und Ideologie in der Politik, von Cabralde Moncada.--Nikolai Berdjajew im bolschewistischen Russland, von F. Stepun.--Spinoza-Sokrates-Christus, der Menschensohn und die Philosophen, von H. Schuster.--Wertung und Wirksamkeit der Frau in der christlichen Kirche, von F. Heiler.--Ein neues Dogma? Von O. Schroeder.--Anbrosius von Mailand und sein Verhältnis zum Judentum, von W. Wilbrand.--Das Bild Luthers bei Johannes Hessen, von P. Althaus.--Zur Mystik Augustins, von W. falkenhahn.-Johannes (...) Hessen und Rudolf Ottos "Religlöser Menschheitsbund," von C. Barth.--Eine Antithese zum Jahre 1933, Johannes Hessens prophetische Mahnworte, von T. Pöhler.--Der Lehrer, von H. Höttges. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the effects of social distancing for embodied lived experience in relation to dementia care and experiences of dementia. From a critical phenomenological perspective, I focus specifically on the safety measures of physical distancing and face-masking in pandemic times, asking whether they might risk marginalizing and disembodying people with dementia, especially in isolated healthcare settings. As much as these measures offer physical protection against spreading the virus, I consider how they might disrupt intersubjective processes (e.g., calming (...) social or therapeutic touch) and contribute to “an alienated bodily communication” (Dolezal 2020). From Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies of embodiment and enactive theories of intersubjectivity, to more recent phenomenological work on illness, many authors argue that our existential being-in-the-world is embodied in multimodal and intersubjective ways (Fuchs and De Jaeger 2009; Carel 2016; Ratcliffe 2008; Kontos 2011). For this reason, our lived bodies need to stay in touch and positively interact with other lived bodies. Based on empirical studies of multisensory and interactive therapy in nursing homes before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, I emphasize the effects of distant socializing for patients, care, and carers. My aim is to address the broader structures and discursive practices, which have undergone dramatic changes due to the spread of COVID-19. (shrink)

Muhyiddîn el-Kâfiyecî (öl. 879/1474), on beşinci yüzyıl Saruhanoğulları, Osmanlı ve Memlüklü alimlerindendir. Yüzden çok eser yazmıştır. Makale Kâfiyeci’nin hayatı ve eserlerini araştırır. Yazdığı eserler, onun, Arap dili, Arap grameri, belagat, tarih metodolojisi, hadis ve usulü, tefsir ve usulü, fıkıh ve usulü, kelâm, tasavvuf, dil felsefesi, semantik, metafizik meseleler, geometri, optik ve astronomi gibi konularda uzmanlaştığını göstermektedir. Kâfiyeci en önemli eserlerini Arap dili ve mantık sahalarında yazmıştır. Eserleri içerisinde yaptığı linguistik çözümlemeler, onun yetkin bir dil alimi olduğunu göstermektedir. Kâfiyeci eserlerini yazarken (...) linguistik, mantıki, ilmi ve felsefi bir yöntem kullanmıştır. Araştırmada, Kâfiyeci’nin, hayatı boyunca en az yüz on iki eser yazdığı tespit edilmiştir. Bu eserlerden, doksan altısının adı belirlenmiştir. Kâfiyeci’nin eserleri konularına göre şöylece tasnif edilebilir: Arap Dili ve Dil Felsefesi: Şerḥu’1-i‘râb ‘an Ḳavâ‘idi’l-i‘râb, el-Unmûzec fî baḥsi’l-isti‘âre, Şerḥu’l-isti‘âre, Risâle fî Kâne Zeydun Ḳâimen, Risâle fî Zeydun Ḳâimun, Risâle fi’l-mebâḥisi’l-mute‘alliḳa bi Emmâ, Nuzhetu’l-mu‘rib fi’l-Meşrıḳ ve’l-Maġrib, Nuzhetu’l-aṣhâb fî mes’eleti’l-kuhl, Remzu’l-esrâr, en-Niseb li ehli’l-edeb, el-İşrâḳ fî meratibi’ṭ-ṭıbâk, Ḥâşiye ‘ale’l-Muṭavvel, Risâle fî “men” eş-şartiyye. Mantık: et-Terġîb fî keşfi rumûzi’t-Tehẕîb. Tarih Metodolojisi: el-Muḫtaṣaru’l-mufîd fî ‘ilmi’t-târîḫ, en-Naṣru’l-ḳâhir ve’l-fetḥu’ẓ-ẓâhir. Akâid ve Kelâm: Envâru’ṣ-Ṣa ‘âde, Şerḥu’l-‘Aḳâidi’l-‘Aḍuḍiyye, Hâşiye ‘alâ Şerḥi’l-‘Aḳâidi’l-‘Aḍuḍiyye, Şerḥu’l-Mevâḳıf, Telḫîsu Şerḥi’l-Mevâḳıf, el-Hidâye li beyâni’l-ḫalḳ ve’t-tekvîn, Risâle fî beyâni’l-mu‘cizât, Nehru’l-hayât fî ma‘rifeti’ṣ-ṣıfât, ‘İlmu’l-kumûn ve’l-burûz, Risâle fî Kavlihi Teâlâ “Lâ ye’menu mekr Allâhi ille’l-kavmu’l-hâsirûn” [A‘râf, 7/99]. Kur’ân, Kırâat ve Tefsir Bilimleri: Şerḥu’l-İsti‘âẕe ve’l-Besmele, Ḥâşiye ‘ale’l-Keşşâf, Şerḥ fî muḥâkemât beyne’l-mutekellimîn ‘ale’l-Keşşâf, Ḥâşiye ‘alâ Tefsîri’l-Beyḍâvî, eẓ-Ẓafer ve’l-ḫalâṣ, et-Teysîr fî ḳavâ‘idi ‘ilmi’t-tefsîr, Risâle fî ‘ilmi’t-tefsîr ve vucûhi’l-ḳırâat, Keşfu’n-niḳâb li’l-aṣḥâb ve’l-aḥıbbe fî ‘icâzi’l-Ḳur’ân, et-Temhîd fî şerḥi’t-taḥmîd, Ḳarâru’l-vecd fi şerḥi’l-ḥamd, el-İlmâ‘ bi ifâdeti Lev li’l-imtinâ‘ fî ḳavlihi Te‘âlâ “Lev kâne fîhimâ âlihetun illallâh le fesedetâ” [Enbiyâ, 21/22], Cevâb ‘an suâl fî ḳavlihi Te‘âlâ “Ve’n-Necmi iẕâ hevâ” [Necm, 62/1], Nuzhetu’l-iḫvân fî tefsi¬ri ḳavlihi Te‘âlâ “Yâ Lûṭu İnnâ Rusülü Rabbike” [Hûd, 11/81], Neylu’l-merâm fi tefsîri ḳavlihi Te‘âlâ “Ve Mâ Rabbuke bi Ẓallâm” [Fussilet, 41/46], el-Bişâra fî ḳavlihi Te‘âlâ “Fe’tû bi sûratin min mislih” [Bakara, 2/23], Nuzhetu’l-aṣḥâb, el-Ġurratu’l-vâḍıḥa fî tefsîri’l-Fâtiḥa, Zeḫîratu’l-ḳaṣr fî tefsiri Sûrati’l-‘Aṣr. Hadis Bilimleri: Muḫtaṣar fî ‘ulûmi’l-ḥadîs, Menbe‘u’d-durer fî ‘ilmi’l-eser, Ḫulâṣatu’l-‘aḳvâl fî ḥadîsi “İnneme’l-a‘mâlu bi’n-niyyât”. Fıkıh, Usûl ve Fetva: Risale fî mesʹeleti’l-istisnâʹ, Ḥâşiye ‘ala şerḥi’l-Hidâye, Vecîzu’n-niẓâm fî ıẓhâri mevâridi’l-aḥkâm, el-Feraḥ ve’s-surûr fî beyâni’l-meẕâhîbi’l-erba‘ati fi’l-‘uṣûr, Neşâtu’ṣ-ṣudûr fî şerḥi Kitâbi’l-Feraḥ ve’s-surûr, et-Taḥrîr lima zukira fi’d-Dureri’l-manẓûm, Muhâveratu’l-fıḳhiyye, Risâle fi’stiḳbâli’l-Ḳıble, Telḫîṣu’l-Câmi‘i’l-kebîr ve’l-Mecma‘, Kitâbu’t-Teẕkira/Risâle fi’l-vaḳf, Ravḍatu’ẓ-ẓahira en-nâfi‘a fî’d-Dünya ve’l-Âḫira, Kitâbu’l-muḫtasar fî ‘ilmi’l-istibdâl, er-Remz fî ‘ilmi'l-istibdâl, el-Kâfî fî beyâni’ṣ-ṣaffi’ṭ-ṭavîli’l-mustaḳîm, Risâle fî ṭabaḳâti’l-butûn li beyâni’l-vaḳf ‘alâ evlâdi’l-evlâd, el-İḥkâm fî ma‘rifeti’l-Eymân ve’l-aḥkâm, Ferâid baḥri’l-fevâiḍ. Siyasetname, Adap ve Ahlak: Niẓâmu ḳalâidi’l-‘ıḳyân, Seyfu’l-kuḍât ‘ale’l-buġât, Seyfu’l-mulûk ve’l-ḥukkâm el-murşid lehum ilâ sebîli’1-Haḳḳ ve’1-aḥkâm, Seyfu’l-ḥaḳḳ ve’n-nuṣra ‘alâ riḳâbı ehli’l-baġy ve’l-fitne, ed-Durratu’l-‘âliyetu’l-ġâliye. Metafizik, Tasavvuf ve Felsefe: el-Kâfî eş-şâfî, Kitâbu’r-ravḥ fî ‘ilmi’r-rûḥ, Kitabu’r-raḥme fî beyânı aḥvâli ‘alemi’l-berzâḫ, en-Nuzhe fî ravḍati’r-rûḥ ve’n-nefs, Neşâtu’l-bişâra bi’l-işâra fî kıbleti’l-ervâh, Ḳıbletu’l-ervâḥ fi’t-taṣavvuf, Nuzhetu’l-ervâḥ ve ġıbṭatu’l-eşbâḥ fi’t-taṣavvuf, Menâzilu’l-ervâḥ fi’t-taṣavvuf, ‘Ikdu’l-ferâid min baḥri’l-fevâiḍ fî şerḥi Esmâillâhi’l-husnâ, el-Unsu’1-enîs fî ma‘rifeti şeʹni’n-nefsi’n-nefîs. Siyer, İrşat ve Fazâil: Zeynu’l-feraḥ bi mîlâdi’n-Nebî (s.a.v.), Muḫtasar fî ‘ilmi’l-irşâd, Risâle fi’l-maḥabbe, Ḳalâidu’l-‘ıḳyân fî baḥri faḍâili Raceb ve Şa‘bân: Fen Bilimleri: Ḥallu’l-işkâl fî mebâhisi’l-eşkâl fi’l-hendese, Şerḥu’l-caġmînî fi’l-heyʹe, er-Remz fî ‘ilmi’l-uṣturlâb. Diğer Eserleri: Remzu’l-ḫıṭâb bi raşḥi’l-‘ıyâb, Benâtu’l-efkâr fî şeʹni’l-‘i‘tibâr, Keşfu’l-vucûhi’l-ḥasene’l-mestûra bi’n-niḳâb li faḍlillâhi’l-Cevâdi’l-Vehhâb, el-Keşf ‘an şerafi Ehli’l-Beyti’l-kirâm li efḍali’r-rusuli ve’l-enâm, ‘Iḳdu’l-ferâid min taḥrîri’l-fevâid, Risâle mustaḳılle bi ‘ilmi’n-nefs ve vucûhi’l-ḳırâa, Cevâbu’l-enẓâr, Ḥusnu’l-ḫıtâm li’l-merâmi min haẕa’l-kelâm, Ḫıtâmu’l-misk. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Kısa vadeli likidite sağlama ihtiyacının yanı sıra likidite fazlalığını kısa vadeli değerlendirme ihtiyacı finans kurumlarının ortak problemleridir. Konvansiyonel finans kurumları bu ihtiyaçlarının büyük kısmını repo-ters repo işlemleri ile karşılarken katılım finans kurumları ise faiz şüphesi nedeniyle repo-ters repo katılım bankacılığı ilkelerine uymadığı için bu ihtiyaçları karşılama konusunda problemler yaşamaktadır. Bu durum konvansiyonel finans kurumları ile rekabet halindeki katılım finans kurumları aleyhine işlemektedir. Bu makale repo işlemini ana hatlarıyla açıklayıp fıkhi boyutunu izah ettikten sonra Malezya’daki geri alım vaadi ile satım, Türkiye’deki (...) geri alım vaadi ile satım, organize teverruk, menkul kıymet rehinli karz sözleşmesi ve puantaj sistemi ile tekaruz anlaşması gibi halihazırda İslam dünyasında katılım finans kurumlarının repoya alternatif olarak uyguladıkları işlemleri ele almaktadır. Öte yandan bu çalışma kira sertifikalarının geri alım vaadi ile satımı, yatırım fonları, kira sertifikalarının alım satımı ile teverruk işlemi için katılım finans ilkelerine uygun bir pazar kurulması ve devlet destekli karz-ı hasen fonlarının kurulması gibi katılım finans kurumları adına repoya alternatif olarak düşünülen öneriler üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle's Review of the Presocratics:Is Aristotle Finally a Historian of Philosophy?1Catherine Collobert (bio)"Just as inexperienced soldiers in fights, rushing forward from all sides, often strike fine blows, but without knowledge, so they do not seem to understand what they say" (Met. 985a13-16). This negative judgment of Aristotle about his predecessors has been the object of numerous controversies, which could be summarized by the following question: was Aristotle writing philosophy (...) or history of philosophy when he set out the doctrines of his predecessors?This controversy was reopened2 by H. Cherniss,3 according to whom the Aristotelian review of the Presocratics rests upon, on the one hand, the firm belief of Aristotle that each Presocratic groped around the truth and, on the other hand, the fact that Aristotle judged their mistakes and successes in the light of his own system, understood as the final realization of previous doctrines.4 W. K. C. Guthrie [End Page 281] has replied—renewing Jaeger's arguments5—to Cherniss's thesis, by arguing that Metaphysics, books 1 and 2 show that Aristotle respected the first thinkers and had "a stronger historical sense than most original philosophers possess."6 More recently, H.-G. Gadamer has stated that Aristotle and Plato as well provide "the sole philosophical access to an interpretation of the Presocratics."7To answer the question if Aristotle is a historian of philosophy requires, as a preliminary, a definition of 'history of philosophy.' Now, neither Cherniss nor Guthrie raises the question of the nature of this history—their discussion dealing mainly with the reliability of Aristotle's testimony. Cherniss refuses to bestow on Aristotle the status of historian because he constantly misinterpreted, even betrayed, the Presocratics by a willful lack of exactness. The betrayal is a consequence of a freedom taken by Aristotle toward the texts, which is a corollary of a philosophical but not a historical goal. On the contrary, if one supposes with Guthrie that Aristotle is a historian of philosophy, one has nevertheless to admit that he is one in a very special sense. Indeed he does not respect any of the rules accepted nowadays. It has been a long time, as J. Brunschwig points out without any irony, since "Aristotle summarized Empedocles in eight lines, ending his summary by adding that 'one can realize that in reading his poem.'"8The discussion concerning Aristotle's historical method results from his systematic review of the forerunners' doctrines, of which Aristotle is not really the father. Indeed, as J. Mansfeld reminds us, "the rudimentary beginnings of the historiography of Greek philosophy may be dated to the period of the Sophists."9 In order to understand the nature of Aristotle's discussion of the Presocratics, one has first to understand the methodological role of his review of the Presocratics' doctrines. In other words, one must determine whether this review is to be considered as an act of history of philosophy, consisting in a report and an explanation, i.e., an interpretation of these doctrines, or as being an opportunity to philosophize. Many points are at stake. First, this issue is interesting for historians of Presocratic philosophy (who are compelled to question the authenticity of the fragments quoted by Aristotle), and second, for those who think about methods used in the history of philosophy, and finally, for those who raise questions about the relationship between philosophy and its history.In order to clarify the notion of history of philosophy, one could borrow a definition from M. Gueroult:It is a fact that a historical succession of doctrines exists. If one considers it from a strictly historical point of view, this succession has to appear as a succession of events that are [End Page 282] subject to the laws of a historical determinism, explainable by the play of contingent and individual causes, where the past is evoked only as an explanatory factor for the present. The succession of doctrines will thus constitute historical data.10Gueroult deduces elsewhere11 the existence de facto of history of philosophy from the existence of studies and researches on past philosophies. History of philosophy implies first that philosophy has a past to examine... (shrink)

Foucault’s lectures from early 1979 on the German Ordo-liberalen are typically taken to comprise his most comprehensive account of why Germany is important for understanding neo-liberal governmentality more broadly. This paper argues, to the contrary, that the 1979 lectures actually obscure a potentially more complete account of German, neo-liberal governmentality Foucault had begun to sketch in 1977. To support this reading and to offer an explanation of why Foucault would have decided to alter his presentation of West German neo-liberalism, the (...) paper undertakes a genealogy of Foucault’s involvement with West German political issues in 1977 and 1978. The core claims that structure the argument are as follows: (1) Key aspects of the “security state” that Foucault began to work out in 1977, must have been at least partly modeled on West German “militant” or “battle-ready” democracy; (2) Yet, in his 1979 lectures, there is no longer any trace of these repressive, extralegal dimensions; (3) This shift was motivated to a significant extent by his 1977 disagreement with Deleuze, Guattari, and others over whether the West German state of the late 1970s could be considered “fascist.” This concern to contest the accusation of fascism is carried forward in his 1979 lectures in a critique of “state phobia.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION MICHAEL POTTS Methodist Callege Fayetteville, North Carolina I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW A. The Influence of Plato HE SPATIO-TEMPORAL theory of individuation has long history in the philosophical tradition. Its roots go ack to Aristotle's theory of individuation by matter,1 and ultimately back to Plato. In the Timaeus, Plato struggled with the problem of how forms are instantiated in the phenomenal world. Besides " a model (...) form (paradeigmatos eidos), intelligible and ever uniformly existent" and "the model's copy (mimeta paradeigmatos), subject to becoming and visible," Plato postulated a third thing, a " receptacle " (hupodochen), "the nurse of all becoming." 2 It is wholly indeterminate:... while it is always receiving all things, nowhere and in no wise does it assume any shape similar to any of the things that enter into it. For it is laid down by nature as a moulding-stuff for everything, being moved and marked by the entering figures, and because of them it appears different at different times. And the figures that enter and depart are copies of those that are always existent, being stamped from them...8 1 I recognize that this is a controversial claim. Since I am tracing the spatio-temporal theory of individuation from Aristotle through St. Thomas Aquinas, for the purposes of this paper I will follow St. Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle and accept the view that Aristotle took matter to be the principle of individuation. 2 Plato, Timaeus 49a. The version used is the Loeb edition by R. G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). a Timaeus 50b-c. 59 60 MICHAEL POTTS The receptacle, then, is like formless wax upon which the forms are stamped. It is " apprehensible by a kind of bastard reasoning (logismo tini notho), barely an object of belief." 4 B. Aristotle It may seem on the surface unusual that the idea of the receptable would later be modified and used to explain individuation. Plato himself was concerned with the universal, the form. The instantiations of the forms in the phenomenal world do not even deserve to be called "this " or " that." 5 With Aristotle, however, the individual gains new importance, since for him forms have their reality only in individuals and individuals are primarily called "substance." If this is the case, then Aristotle has to explain how " humanity " can be the same while " Socrates" and " Callias" are two different individuals. Since form is universal, it cannot individuate, so the source of individuation must be matter-two individuals are different human beings, for example, because they have different lumps of matter.... and when the whole has been generated, such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates, and this is distinct from that which generated it because the matter is distinct (hulen, hetera gar), but it is the same in species since the species is indivisible.6 This view raises problems. Matter is indeterminate; it is Aristotle 's modification of Plato's receptacle. How can anything indeterminate itself determine individual substances? More needed to be done to.bring out the meaning of individuation by matter, and St. Thomas Aquinas developed a more detailed and satisfactory position. 4 Timaeus 52b. 5 Timaeus 49d-50a. 6 Aristotle, Metaphyscis 28 (1034a5-8). The Greek text used is Metaphysica, ed. by Werner Jaeger (Oxonii : E Typographaeo Clarendoniano, 1957). The English translation is by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: Peripatetic Press, 1979). THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION 61 C. St. Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, recognizing that prime matter is indeterminate and therefore not something that can individuate, argues that the principle of individuation is " signate" or " designated" matter. "Materia signata" is defined as matter as " sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur," " considered under determinate dimensions." 7 While the exact meaning of this is unclear, it seems to refer to matter under determinate spatial dimensions or coordinates. While the form determines what sort of thing an entity is, what determines it to be this individual is this matter with a particular set of spatial coordinates. Henry Veatch puts Aquinas's view into more modern terms: In fact, matter as determined by dimensive quantity guarantees ontologically nothing more nor less than the... (shrink)

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...) that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links. Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions PARMENIDES THE PROPHET~ The latest word on Parmenides comes from a recent and exhaustive study by Leonardo Tar~n. 1 Among other illuminating and novel interpretations, Tarhn argues that Parmenides was not, after all, guilty of the confusion between the existential and copulative senses of "to be," that he did not identify thinking with Being, and that he had no conception of atemporal reality.~ In these and (...) other respects Tar~n's volume makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of Parmenides. One might judge, however, that Tars work is unusually insensitive to the religious element in Parmenides' poem, and in this respect his analysis seems to echo Reinhardt's unfortunate judgment which calls Parmenides "einen Denker, der keinen Wunsch kennt als Erkenntnis, keine Fessel ffihlt als Logik, den Gott und Geffihl gleichgiiltig lassen." s This inadequacy of TarAn's approach to Parmenides is evident in his treatment of the poem in general, and especially the prologue. The prologue to Parmenides' poem has always been a source of debate. After exploring and rejecting the allegorical interpretation of Sextus (the main source for the proem), Tar~n then systematically examines and rejects the modern interpretations which (among others) make it out to be a shamanistic rapture (Diels, Cornford), Orphic apocalypse (Burnet), religious revelation (Jaeger, Bowra), and mystical experience (Verdenius).4 TarAn judges that Parmenides did not intend his journey to be taken as a reality in any sense, largely on the grounds (1) that Parmenides speaks of his journey as a repeated experience. To take seriously the iterative expressions of the prologue (e.g. fr. 1, lines 1, 3, 8) is incompatible with interpretations which construe it to refer to a specific occasion.6 He supports the conclusion that the proem is nothing more than a literary device with the observations (2) that symbolic interpretations are incongruous with the fact that the goddess expounds her doctrine without symbols, and (3) that the appeal is to Logos, the rational, critical faculty; (4) that the goddess remains anonymous shows that she stands for no religious figure at all ("the 'revelation' is the truth discovered by Parmenides himself"); and (5) that Parmenides could hardly expect us to take seriously the reality of the goddess and other elements in the proem, the reality of which would be entirely incompatible with the thesis of the poem, viz. that reality is One and that all multiplicity and distinction is unreal. ~ z Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays (Princeton, 1965). See my review of this work in The Classical Journal, LXII (1967),232ff. aParmenides und die Geschiehtc der griechischen Philosophic (Bonn, 1916),p. 256. 4TarGn,p. 17ft.Guthrie believes that Parmenides recognized an affinity between his search for truth, and his religious activity and mystical experience, and that he reflected this in his mystical-allegorical prologue (History of Greek Philosophy [Cambridge, 1965],II, 13). Guthrie was not, apparently, aware of Ta~n's work when he wrote his second volume; and on the matter of the prologue he favors the work of Mansfeld (Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschlichc Welt [Assen, 1964],chap. IV), and Bowra ("The Proem of Parmenides," Classical Philology, XXXII [1987],97ff). Tar~n, p. 30. * P. 30f. [67] 68 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY It is probably true that interpretations which find all sorts of religious elements in the proem (and the poem as a whole) go too far. On the other hand, Tar~n gives the impression that Parmenides was nothing more than a pedantic academician, and in this respect he tends to sin in the opposite direction. First, the possible religious significance of the prologue does not depend on its being taken to refer to a literal experience; but even if it did, it need not refer to a specific event; and even if that were so, it is a little forced to exclude a specific event in view of the iterative expressions which may be no more than a function of poetic style. As for his second charge, Tar~n seems unaware that the main part of the poem hardly lends itself to symbolic expression, and afortiori the prologue, with its symbolism, sets the religious mood for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Bibliography on Plato's "'Laws, "" 1920-1970: With Additional Citations through May, 1975. By Trevor J. Saunders. (New York: Arno Press, 1976. Pp. i + 60. $15.00) The Penguin Classics translator of the non-Socratic Laws, as Leo Strauss called them, has here compiled in a most usable way a thorough bibliography of books and articles about the Laws or parts of them. The section "Texts, Translations, and Commentaries" (...) properly excludes translations not made directly from the Greek. In previous centuries this would, also properly, have excluded many a famous or popular translation, such as Thomas Taylor's or Victor Cousin's, worked out from the text of M. Ficino's "first edition" in Latin. Given the state of the Greek text and the practice, inaugurated by Ficino, of improving upon the Greek in the translatioias, some notation about the literalness of the translations cited would have been of additional value. Section B, in thirty pages, is the largest and also deliberately the most selective in striving to limit itself to work concerned exclusively or primarily with the Laws. But it cannot avoid including much material about some aspect of Plato in general rather than about the Laws; this is especially true of the subsection, B1, on comprehensive accounts. Section B2, on the text and its tradition, has overwhelmingly more citations about the indirect tradition than about the texts themselves, an interesting indication of the current state of this question. The next subsections, to B12, divide according to subject matter. BI3 lists studies on the influence of the Laws. The last section, in twenty-four pages, is most valuable. It lists, by Stephanus page number, an abundance of discussions of individual passages from Book I through Book XII wherever these discussions, bibliographically speaking, may have occurred. Students of the Laws will be well served by, and most grateful to, Professor Saunders for this bibliography. I can only second the intent of his parting epigraph that sends us back to the study of the Laws themselves. But I must add that more explicitly detailed work appears to be required both on the difficulties the text itself presents to students of Plato (one thinks of A. Boeckh's analyses of the prose in Books I through III) and on those which arise when the Laws is contrasted--from the point of view of design and intellectuality--with those of Plato's works that are comparable, if not in number of pages, at least in scale of conception and monumentality. V. TEJERA SUNY at Stony Brook Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works. By Anthony Preus. (Hildesheim and New York: George Olms, 1975. Pp. ix + 404. DM.88) A reciprocal influence between Aristotle's philosophy and biology--if it could be demonstrated through step-by-step criticism and not merely asserted in generalities about functionalism--might help to explain both, and might also itself be philosophically interesting ; for it should clarify Aristotle's concepts of form, essence, universal, and species-concepts which have been mercilessly jumbled in the traditional interpretations. With the failure of Jaegerian developmental analyses, we can hardly now hope for help from detailed chronology. But a general dating of Aristotle's biological interest to the Assos-Mytilene period, when he was already aged forty, is accepted by most people (though not by Jaeger who [463] 464 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY put it at the end, nor by Ryle who put it at the beginning of Aristotle's career) and is the basis of Anthony Preus's contention in this book. For if Aristotle began serious biology only in middle life we could expect a tension between the antiphenomenal metaphysics of the Academy, which he had just left after twenty years there, and the kind of philosophizing and explaining that might seem demanded by living concrete organisms. Preus sets out to show such a tension, claiming on page 1 that "in P. A. and G. A. sometimes the philosophical position is bent to fit the observed facts, and sometimes the observations are adjusted to fit the philosophical position." The reader may be assured at once that this appalling accusation (which is repeated in the publisher's blurb) is not... (shrink)

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Bu çalı ş mada Nuh b. Mustafa el-Konevi’nin “fethu'l-celil alâ abdihi'z-zelîl fî beyâni mâ verede fi'l-istihlâf fi'l-cümü'ati mine'l-ekâvil ” adlı risalesinin tahkikli çalı ş ması yapıldı. Büyük bir alim ve fakih olan müellifimiz zamanın Konya müftüsüdür. Mısır’a tabli ğ ve ilmi faaliyetlerini gerçekleçtirmek için hicret ettikten sonra orada vefat etmi ş tir. İ lmi alanlarda bir çok gayreti vardır. Özellikle fıkıh ve fıkıh usulü sahasında önemli eserlere imza atmı ş tır. Söz konusu bu risale, süleymaniye kütüphanesine ba ğ lı veliyüddin (...) Efendi kütüphanesinden elde edilen iki el yazması esas alınarak tahkik edilmi ş tir. “Fethu'l-celil alâ abdihi'z-zelîl fî beyâni mâ verede fi'l-istihlâf fi'l-cümü'ati mine'l-ekâvil” adlı risalesi Cuma günü hutbe okumak için birinin imam tarafından tayin edilme konusunu ele alır. Nitekim son dönem hanefi fakihlerinden İ bn Kemal Pa ş a, Molla Hüsrev, Hasen e ş - Ş ürünbülâlî gibi di ğ er bir ço ğ u bu konuda eser kaleme almı ş tır. Bu sahada telif edenlerden birisi de müellifimiz Nuh b. Mustafa el-Konevi’dir. Bu çalı ş masında, konu gere ğ i alimlerin görü ş lerini zikreder, kendisi ile ihtilafa dü ş en görü ş ü ilmi bir üslupla tartı ş arak analiz ettikten sonra tercih etti ğ i görü ş ü ortaya koyar. Sonuç olarak, hutbe ve namaz için ister özür olsun ister olmasın imamın cemaatten birini tayin etmesi meselesine cevaz verir. (shrink)

A central theme in the scholarly literature on Enlightenment Europe concerns the increased focus on the role of reason in the development of European thought, especially in the development of the new science by the natural philosophers. As a consequence, there is a tendency in both philosophical scholarship and teaching to bind philosophy and science tightly together. While there is certainly much that is correct in this approach, one motivation for pluralizing philosophy’s past is that this story leaves out a (...) great deal that is important in Enlightenment views of reason. We argue, using as an example the work of figures like Margaret Cavendish, that reason was significantly broader in scope—and that developments in science were paralleled by equally important advances in music, art, literature, medicine, philosophy, and other areas. In recognizing the lack of a sharp boundary between these areas, an inclusive canon of Enlightenment philosophy gives us this richer notion of reason. Integrating figures such as Cavendish into the canon helps us to see that the narrow focus on the scientific version of reason within Enlightenment scholarship creates a false distinction between science and the humanities and misses out on the humanistic ends for which we engage in philosophy. (shrink)

To incorporate medical ethics into clinical practice, it must first be understood and valued by health care professionals. The recognition of this principle led to an expanding and continuing educational effort by the ethics committee of the Vancouver General Hospital. This paper reviews this venture, including some pitfalls and failures, as well as successes. Although we began with consultants, it quickly became apparent that education in medical ethics must reach all health care professionals—and medical students as well. Our greatest successes (...) came in the formative years of a medical career (ie, in medical school and residency training programmes), but other efforts were not wasted, particularly among nurses and other health care professionals.Although this is a personal review of the experience in one institution, the lessons learnt in Vancouver are applicable to the further development of medical ethics in the UK. (shrink)

This article explores children’s narrative identity formation and the impact of adult–child relationships on shaping a child’s narrative. The formation of identity in all children is vulnerable to a culture of ‘adultism’, wherein the authority wielded by adults can potentially subject children to abuse and neglect. Consequently, adultism has the aptitude to hinder the constructive development of a life-affirming identity in children. The primary objective of this article is to develop a childist narrative theology of praxis methodology, aimed at raising (...) consciousness and educating adults on both life-denying and life-giving ways of engaging in the process of children’s narrative identity formation.To achieve this goal, the methodology is developed by adapting Denise Ackermann’s ‘feminist theology of praxis’ to focus specifically on children. The application of feminist theory principles is deemed relevant to the social standing of children as it aligns with the broader goal of liberating oppressed groups, whether women or children. Additionally, John Wall’s work is employed to elucidate the terms ‘childist’ and ‘childism’ as interpretive frameworks. Positioned within the scientific domain of Practical Theology, this study seeks to transform conditions that impede human flourishing into opportunities for positive change.The research objectives determine that a literature review will be suitable to gather essential information for the formulation of a childist narrative theology of praxis. This review, characterised as explorative and descriptive, is conducted within the field of Practical Theology.Contribution: The significance of this study is underscored by its exploration and description of the pastoral functions of consciousness, awareness-raising, and education concerning adult–child relations. By scrutinising these pastoral functions, the emphasis is placed on the proactive, preventive, and universal aspects of pastoral care in the context of children, thereby contributing valuable insights to the discourse. (shrink)

The adjective ἱερός is a central term in Greek religion and is used in various contexts. Generally translated ‘sacred’, it indicates that an object has been conceded to the gods and is now in relation with them (relation of belonging, protection, etc.). It appears frequently in Greek inscriptions in the expression τὰ ἱερά, to designate sacred objects or, in a more abstract meaning, sacred matters.